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Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s anti-social behaviour (ASB) – and responses thereto – have played a 
prominent role in both political discourse and the criminal justice system. Amidst significant 
focus on problems associated with ASB, there emerged a shift in governmental policies 
towards risk management and preventive-led interventions.1  Not only was this shift aimed at 
providing a means of early intervention, it also had the objective of moving towards a more 
victim-oriented approach.2 The criminal justice system had previously been accused of 
‘safeguarding the rights of the accused’ at the expense of paying sufficient attention to the harm 
suffered by victims and their needs.3 Hence, the need for a more balanced approach.  
The cornerstone of the response to ASB was the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), 
which was introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.4 In 2014, the enactment of the 
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 sought to revolutionise the law on ASB 
by providing a more effective and flexible legal framework to local communities.5 To this end, 
a raft of new measures were introduced. Some of these new measures, such as the Part 1 
injunction, repealed and replaced pre-existing instruments, such as the ASBO, whereas others, 
such as the Community Trigger,6 are completely new.  
This article offers new insights into the ASB regime by focusing on key developments 
under the 2014 Act. The article is structured in three parts. It begins by providing a critical 
analysis of the pre-2014 legal framework on ASB and the main challenges posed by it. Second, 
it offers a critical evaluation of the 2014 amendments focusing specifically on: i) the extended 
definition of ASB; ii) the repeal and replacement of both the ASBO and the post-conviction 
ASBO (CrASBO) by the injunction and the Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) respectively; 
and iii) the introduction of positive obligations. Third, the article presents findings of an 
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empirical study conducted with local enforcement agents focusing on the impact that the 
abovementioned developments have had on the daily administration of ASB at a local level.7 
Although there is extensive empirical research on the pre-2014 ASB framework,8 this article 
delivers the first empirical data (that the author is aware of) on the implementation of the 2014 
amendments.  
 The findings of this study mitigate against some of the concerns raised about the 
potential misuse of the ASB legislation, e.g. the possibility of extending the scope of the law 
to purely innocent behaviour. This due to a number of factors, such as the limited availability 
of resources and the presence of a review procedure. The findings of this study, however, 
should be approach with caution since the implementation of the ASB measures can vary 
considerably across England and Wales. The possibility, therefore, of using these measures in 
an arbitrary manner cannot be dismissed. This article argues that the findings of this study 
could assist in the formulation of a new code of practice for local enforcement agents through 
which the misuse of the ASB legislation can be prevented whilst ensuring a more coherent 
implementation of the relevant tools and powers. 
    
The initial response to anti-social behaviour 
As a line of high profile cases suggests, such as that of Fiona Pilkington,9 ASB can range from 
everyday incivilities, such as noisy neighbours, to behaviour already proscribed by criminal 
law, such as criminal damage, and can have a devastating effect on people’s quality of life.10 
Certain kinds of ASB, especially those situated at the lower end of the spectrum, can be 
dismissed as too trivial to warrant any kind of formal legal intervention.11 What is really 
problematic about ASB, though, is often the cumulative impact of the behaviour rather than 
the seriousness of each isolated incident. It was this need to protect the public from persistent 
low-level criminality that provided the impetus for the introduction of the initial ASB legal 
framework in the late 1990s.12 ASB had been prominent in the Labour Party General Election 
campaign.13 While the ‘New Labour’ government was of the view that the link between ASB 
and criminality was undeniable, they did not believe that such conduct should be criminalised 
in its own right.14 Instead, a new hybrid method of social regulation was needed in order to 
enable the state to intervene at an early stage preventing ASB from escalating to serious 
criminality.15  
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The first major legislative attempt to tackle ASB as a specific concept was the ASBO 
under section 1 of the 1998 Act.16 The ASBO constituted a ‘two-step criminalisation process’ 
where a ‘civil prohibitory order’ was issued.17 If someone’s behaviour ‘caused or was likely to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as 
himself’, then one of the ‘relevant authorities’ listed under section 1, such as the police, could 
submit an application to court for the issue of an ASBO against that individual. If the court was 
satisfied that the perpetrator behaved in an anti-social manner, it could then approve the 
imposition of any restrictions deemed necessary on the perpetrator in order to prevent further 
ASB.18 Some of the most common types of restrictions imposed included curfews, exclusion 
from particular areas and ‘prohibitions on certain kinds of conduct’.19 Breach of the restrictions 
imposed without any reasonable excuse constituted a criminal offence carrying a maximum 
sentence of five years imprisonment and a fine.20    
The definition of ASB under the 1998 Act is also noteworthy: there was no need for the 
authority to prove that someone’s behaviour had actually caused ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ 
before being granted an ASBO. They needed only to prove that the perpetrator’s behaviour was 
likely to cause any of the abovementioned results.21 In effect, this meant that: (i) severe 
restrictions could be imposed on someone’s liberty even if his behaviour had not actually 
caused ‘harassment, alarm or distress’; and (ii) one could face a lengthy custodial sentence 
simply for breaching a civil order even where the underlying conduct was not itself criminal.22 
Although, in theory, the ASBO offered the necessary flexibility needed to address 
persistent low-level criminality and ASB, its introduction was fiercely opposed and criticised 
by many legal commentators.23 Central to most of these criticisms was the significant 
magnitude of discretion afforded to courts and local enforcement agents regarding the 
implementation and the potential misuse of the ASBO. Duff, for instance, characterised the 
ASBO as a ‘pseudo-non-criminal’ measure, since it could be used as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution in order to address behaviour which should have been dealt with by the criminal 
law.24 Others, such as Stephens, focused on ASB’s statutory definition and how broadly this 
could be interpreted.25 Upon closer scrutiny of ASB’s statutory definition, it is evident that the 
law focused primarily on the impact or potential impact of someone’s behaviour on others 
rather than the actual nature of the behaviour in question. This meant that any kind of behaviour 
could potentially be regarded as anti-social regardless of its nature.26 This also meant that 
victims, local enforcement agents and the courts played a crucial role in determining the true 
boundaries of the law in this area. As Stephen contends, the ambiguous boundaries of ASB’s 
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statutory definition allowed the scope of the law to be extended to behaviour that went well 
beyond what was originally intended by the legislature, expanding the net of social control 
‘potentially [to] “‘all spheres of life’”.27 It is for this reason that ASB should be interpreted 
with caution, since if left unrestrained it can result in situations where personal eccentricities, 
such as making sarcastic remarks,28 could be regarded as anti-social simply because someone’s 
behaviour diverges from what is perceived as normal or goes beyond what is tolerated by 
others.29    
Clearly, the importance of the abovementioned criticisms regarding the potential 
misuse of the ASBO were heightened by the order’s hybrid nature. Based on the above analysis 
of the ASBO, it appears possible that this order could be used by local enforcement agents and 
courts as a means of criminalising indirectly what they regarded as anti-social since breach of 
the order constituted a criminal offence.30  
The second major statutory instrument introduced to address ASB as a specific concept 
was the CrASBO.31 In contrast to the ASBO, the CrASBO could only be imposed on those 
who were convicted of an offence and behaved in an anti-social manner.32  If the sentencing 
court was convinced that some additional steps were necessary to prevent the perpetrator from 
engaging in further ASB, then a CrASBO could be issued.  The issue of a CrASBO was in 
addition to the sentence received for the triggering offence.33  Similar to the ASBO, breach of 
a CrASBO without any reasonable excuse constituted a criminal offence.34 
 
The current law on anti-social behaviour 
In line with then Coalition Government’s promise for a more flexible and effective legal 
framework, the 2014 Act brought significant changes in the law on ASB.35 The most important 
amendment was the repeal and replacement of the ASBO with a new civil injunction. Part 1 of 
the 2014 Act consolidated a number of orders and injunctions, such as the ASBO and the ASB 
injunction, into a single multi-purpose injunction.36 Although the two-step regulation model 
adopted by the ASBO was retained, the injunction is a purely civil mechanism. In contrast to 
the ASBO, breach of the injunction constitutes a civil ‘contempt of court’ and carries a 
maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine.37 Although breach of 
the injunction no longer constitutes an offence, the applicable standard of proof for breach 
proceedings is the criminal rather than the civil one.38 This is attributed to ‘the potential severity 
of the penalties which the court can impose on respondents’.39 
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 Another important consequence of this shift towards a purely civil response is that those 
found in breach of the injunction cannot be arrested immediately unless a power of arrest is 
attached to the injunction.40 This is a significant change from the ASBO, where the police could 
arrest an individual immediately if they breached their ASBO. This is not the case under the 
new scheme. The court examining the application for the issue of an injunction can attach a 
power of arrest only if it is satisfied that: (i) the respondent used or threatens to use violence 
against others; or (ii) that ‘there is a significant risk to others’ due to the respondent’s 
behaviour.41 If a power of arrest is attached to the injunction, then the police can arrest the 
perpetrator without any warrant.42 Otherwise, the police must apply for the issue of an arrest 
warrant.43   
As far as the CrASBO is concerned, this was repealed and replaced under Part 2 of the 
2014 Act by the CBO. Although the CBO retains most of the CrASBO’s key features, it is 
worth examining some of the most important changes brought in by the 2014 Act. First, in 
order for a CBO to be issued the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
offender has acted in an anti-social manner.44 In contrast to this, in order for a CrASBO to have 
been issued, the court needed only to ‘consider that the offender has acted’ in an anti-social 
manner’.45 Second, a CrASBO could only be used if the court examining the application was 
satisfied that this was a necessary means to protect members of the public from further ASB.46 
In order for a CBO to be issued the court must be satisfied that the ‘order will help in preventing 
the offender from engaging’ in further ASB.47 The 2014 Act, therefore, appears to lower the 
required threshold that must be met in order for a CBO to be imposed. 
Another major development has been the introduction of positive obligations. Under 
the 1998 Act an ASBO or a CrASBO could only prohibit a person from doing anything 
mentioned in the order. If there was, for example, evidence to suggest that the perpetrator, who 
was an alcoholic, was congregating with others in the town centre after midnight causing ASB, 
then the court could impose a home curfew on him during night hours in order to prevent him 
from behaving in the same manner in the future. The imposition of restrictions alone, however, 
do not necessarily address the underlying causes of ASB and thus provide permanent relief to 
local communities. 48 Indeed, evidence suggests that the imposition of exclusion zones or other 
forms of prohibitions often led to the ‘displacement of crime and anti-social behaviour both 
within’ the same town and nearby places.49 Consequently, the introduction of positive 
obligations can be regarded as an explicit acknowledgement by the Government that ASB is 
sometimes the direct result of deeper causes, not mere defiance of the law.50 The perpetrator, 
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for instance, can be prohibited from entering the town centre and at the same time ordered to 
attend an alcohol-related rehabilitative programme.  
Although the introduction of these positive requirements has the potential of addressing 
the underlying causes of ASB, it also raises concerns as to the severity of the constraints placed 
on the perpetrators’ liberty. This criticism is even more notable in light of the conditions that 
need to be met in order for an injunction to be issued. As the 2014 Act appears on the statute 
book, the issue of an injunction seems much easier compared to the ASBO. Under the 1998 
Act, an ASBO could only be issued if the court examining the application was satisfied that 
the order was ‘necessary to protect relevant persons from further’ ASB.  Under the 2014 Act, 
the court examining an application for the issue of an injunction needs only to consider ‘it just 
and convenient to grant the injunction for the purpose of preventing’ further ASB.51 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the enactment of the 2014 Act also had an impact 
on the statutory definition of ASB. ASB is defined under section 2 of the 2014 Act which draws 
a distinction between two types of ASB, housing and non-housing related. The former includes 
behaviour which is ‘capable of causing nuisance and annoyance’ in a housing-related context.52 
As to the latter, section 2 makes reference to behaviour which ‘caused or was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress’ or ‘capable of causing nuisance and annoyance’ to others.53 
Section 2 evidently expands the ambit of the ASB measures by allowing for the imposition of 
an injunction or of a CBO in cases where the perpetrator’s behaviour has or is likely to have a 
negative impact only on individuals living in the same household as himself. This expansion 
in the scope of the ASB legislation can be attributed to the consolidation of a number of legal 
instruments, such as the ASB injunction, under Part 1 of the 2014 Act.54  
 
Implementing anti-social behaviour measures at a local level 
Although the move to a purely civil injunction appears to mitigate against some of the concerns 
raised about the ASBO, under the 2014 Act a significant magnitude of discretion is still 
afforded to local enforcement agents and courts regarding both the scope of the law in this area 
and the nature of the obligations that can be imposed on those against whom the ASB measures 
are used. It is, therefore, essential to study empirically the implementation of these measures 
in order to: i) examine how these are used in practice; and ii) to investigate whether the 2014 
amendments managed to address the abovementioned concerns raised about the potential 
misuse of these measures.   
7 
 
In the remainder of this paper findings of a two-year empirical study conducted on the 
implementation of the 2014 amendments will be presented.55 These are the first empirical data 
(that the author is aware of) on the 2014 amendments and shed light on: i) how ASB is being 
conceptualised at a local level; and ii) what impacts the recent changes in legislation are having 
on the daily administration of ASB.   
 
Methodology  
The data presented here were collected between May 2015 and April 2016.56 As part of this 
study, semi-structured interviews with police officers and local practitioners57 from two 
counties in England were conducted.58 In total, 29 interviews were conducted in both areas, i.e. 
19 in Site A and 10 in Site B. During this study, 16 local practitioners and 13 police officers 
were interviewed. Due to the criticisms raised about the potential misuse of the ASB measures, 
a conscious decision was taken not to reveal the true identity of the interviewees, their 
institutions or the actual sites investigated.59 To this end, the participants’ true identity was 
replaced by a three-part unique reference code to protect them from the consequences that may 
flow from their participation in this study in the future.60 The first part of the code, e.g. ‘Int.1’, 
represents a random number assigned to each research participant. The second part of the code, 
e.g. ‘PO’, refers to the participant’s occupation, i.e. ‘PO’ and ‘LP’ for police officers and local 
practitioners respectively. The final part of the code refers to the site where the interview took 
place, e.g. ‘Site A’. 
Each area was purposefully selected based on the level of ASB experienced.61 The main 
objective of this study was to collect data from an area which experienced high levels of ASB 
(Site A) and then compare this to the data collected from an area which experienced 
significantly lower levels of ASB (Site B).62 The purpose of this was to ‘capture and describe 
the central themes that cut across a great deal of variation’.63 It was also intended for research 
participants to have a daily interaction with ASB and be responsible for the implementation of 
the legislation at a local level.  
The data collected were analysed thematically using NVivo. Through the initial 
analysis of the data collected key concepts were identified.64 These concepts were given short 
titles in order to categorise important pieces of information relating to this study.65 This initial 
coding led to a more meaningful interpretation of the data.66 This was followed by a thematic 
analysis of the data through which a number of themes relating to the implementation of the 
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2014 amendments were identified.  The interpretation of these themes and their correlation led 
to a deeper understanding of how the ASB measures were used at a local level.67 
 
Research findings 
The findings presented in this paper are categorised as follows:  
i) the way ASB is conceptualised at a local level;  
ii) the shift to a purely civil injunction; and  
iii) the introduction of positive obligations.68 
 
Conceptualising anti-social behaviour 
One of the most concerning features of the pre-2014 legal framework was the statutory 
definition of ASB which, according to its critics, expanded the net of social control to everyday 
‘trivial, sub-criminal, or nuisance behaviour’.69 Hence, the extended definition of ASB under 
the 2014 Act, raises additional concerns as to the scope of the law in this area.  The ambiguous 
limits of the statutory definition were confirmed when research participants were asked about 
how they would personally define ASB. In both sites, the majority of the participants felt that 
it was quite difficult to conceptualise ASB precisely or provide examples of behaviour that 
would definitely fall within the ambit of the law. As one police officer noted ‘almost everything 
fits under the ASB legislation’ (Int.12-PO-Site B). This was further evidenced by the 
participants’ responses when asked to provide examples of behaviour that could possibly be 
regarded as anti-social in their own localities. It was clear from the examples provided that 
ASB could range from behaviour that on face value appears to be part of everyday life, to 
conduct which is already proscribed by criminal law. A local practitioner noted:  
There are a lot of types of behaviour that we do not like or as a society 
we say are unacceptable such as noise, nuisance, it could be drug 
dealing for some people, substance abuse for other people who find it 
quite upsetting and anti-social (Int.4-LP-Site A). 
As far as the lower end of the spectrum is concerned, it was clear that ASB covers primarily 
behaviour that appears to be part of everyday social interaction and not directly regulated by 
law, such as ‘drinking [alcohol and] … being loud’ whilst being in a public place (Int.3-LP-
Site A). Although the use of the ASB measures to address street drinking can be criticised for 
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widening the net of social control to what appears to be a lawful activity,70 evidence from this 
study suggests that local enforcement agents will take into consideration a number of factors 
before labelling someone’s behaviour as anti-social.  
 
(i) Impact and persistence   
Most interviewees highlighted the fact that while some activities appear, in isolation, to be of 
a trivial nature, their cumulative effect on people’s lives can in fact be devastating. On many 
occasions, ASB ‘will determine where people want to live, it will determine their friendships, 
their family [and] it can put strains on relationships’ (Int.16-LP-Site A).  
Although ‘there [was] no specific number of incidents’ required in order for local 
enforcement agents to classify someone’s behaviour as anti-social (Int.19-PO-Site A), it was 
clear from the data collected that either the perpetrator’s behaviour must have a significant 
effect on victims’ lives ‘over a period of time’ or that its impact had been so severe that 
immediate action was needed (Int.24-LP-Site A). As one of the participants put it:   
We are going to review [each incident] and if we think that it is too high 
or has been going on for a long time and nothing that we have done 
seems to have worked…we will then look at enforcement (Int.19-PO-
Site A).   
Such testimonies suggested that a key factor that is considered when determining whether 
something should be classified as ASB is the actual or potential impact on others, which is 
often marked by persistent and repetitive conduct.  This approach was in line with the Home 
Office’s guidelines regarding the way ASB is to be conceptualised at a local level. According 
to these guidelines, ‘the right response in each case will depend on a range of factors, but most 
importantly, on the needs of the victim and the impact the behaviour is having on their lives’.71 
 
(ii) Discretion and common sense 
According to half of the interviewees, the focus on the impact that certain kinds of behaviour 
have on others also helps to explain why similar activities can be treated differently, i.e. as non-
anti-social, depending on the context in which they take place. One police officer explained:  
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Having a house party where no one can hear it for three miles is not 
going to be anti-social. But if you put that same incident … in the 
middle of a town centre it is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress 
... So, same people doing the same thing, different locations, massively 
different impact (Int.26-PO-Site A).   
This need for a flexible legal framework was further evident when participants were asked 
about the 2014 amendments with regards to the way ASB is defined, especially its expansion 
to housing-related behaviour. As many of the participants noted, the ‘same household as 
himself’ clause in the 1998 Act caused ambiguities and ‘grey areas’ especially when the alleged 
incident of ASB took place in hostels and houses of multiple occupancies (Int.5-LP-Site A). 
The abolition of this clause was regarded as a positive development by most of the research 
participants who perceived this as a necessary amendment since ‘it is broadening the net…the 
behaviour can be monitored wider’ and this enables them to shape the scope of the law based 
on the issues faced locally (Int.6-LP-Site A). 
The great magnitude of discretion afforded to enforcement agents regarding the way 
ASB is to be conceptualised seemingly conforms to the Government’s promise for a new legal 
framework that will be capable of ‘provid[ing] faster, more visible justice for victims and 
communities…and that act[s] as a real deterrent’.72 For the majority of the participants this 
flexibility in the statutory definition, particularly the ‘likely to cause’ clause, was vital for the 
protection of vulnerable victims since it enabled them to adopt a more proactive approach 
towards ASB. This allowed local enforcement agents to intervene at an early stage and ‘stop 
the anti-social behaviour rather than leave them to escalate’ (Int.6-LP-Site A). This does not 
necessarily mean that local enforcement agents applied for the issue of an injunction in cases 
where someone’s behaviour was only likely to cause ‘harassment, alarm or distress’. To be 
used in this way would have constituted a significant and possibly unjustifiable expansion of 
the scope of the law in this area.  
Notwithstanding the significant magnitude of discretion afforded to local enforcement 
agents regarding the scope of the law in this area, most of the participants highlighted the need 
for their ‘response to be measured’ and to focus on behaviour that does not fall within the realm 
of everyday social interaction (Int.11-PO-Site B). For instance, one local practitioner argued:  
If it is simply that someone is having children and their children are 
using their own back garden and they are causing nuisance to their 
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neighbours because they do not want to hear children, then that is not 
anti-social behaviour … That is living sound (Int.16-LP-Site B).  
Although the majority of the participants held that a certain degree of flexibility is necessary, 
four interviewees (two from each site) highlighted the risks associated with the broad drafting 
of the statutory definition by characterising it as ‘frighteningly subjective’ (Int.8-LP-Site B). 
As a local practitioner put it, ‘it is becoming potentially quite powerful for local authorities for 
addressing behaviours that they just decide they do not like’ (Int.4-LP-Site A). This, of course, 
can result in the inconsistent implementation of the relevant tools and powers across England 
and Wales. On this view, it appears possible for a particular kind of behaviour to be regarded 
as anti-social in certain parts of the country whereas in others to go unnoticed. It also possible 
for these measures to ‘be used inappropriately and disproportionately against people who 
maybe do not have a voice, [such as] members of the street community’ (Int.4-LP-Site A). 
Clearly, the above criticisms raised by some research participants, pose a number of practical 
and normative questions about the potential implementation of the ASB measures at a local 
level and how this can be prevented without undermining their flexibility. 
 
(iii) Focusing on victims and their experiences 
In Site A, there was strong evidence to suggest that victims’ perceptions were central to the 
way ASB was conceptualised. It was evident that if the complainant was negatively affected 
by someone’s behaviour or if they deemed their behaviour as anti-social, then the investigation 
of this incident would start from the premise that it constituted ASB. The next testimony is 
illustrative of this victim-oriented approach adopted in Site A: ‘it is a victim led, victim witness 
led process. When a victim reports to us that they have felt harassment, alarm or distress then 
that very much informs whether we are going to take it on as a case’ (Int.5-LP-Site A). A 
similar approach was also adopted by the relevant police force. According to one of its 
members ‘a common theme within policing is…that it is actually better to deal with something 
as it has been identified rather than to justify why it is not anti-social’ (Int.28-PO-Site A).  
 The above is not to suggest that local enforcement agents structured their investigation 
and response solely on the alleged victim’s perception of an incident in the absence of any 
other credible evidence. As one of the participants pointed out ‘if we obtain evidence … that 
suggests otherwise we will then make adjustments to that [effect]’ (Int.21-PO-Site A). Instead, 
is to illustrate the importance attributed in Site A to victims and the possible adverse 
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consequences that persistent low-level criminality and ASB can have on them. This is in line 
with the Government’s promise to depart from the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the past.73 The 
views of the victims, therefore, should not be dismissed outright since what might appear to be 
of a trivial nature, can have a devastating effect on the complainant’s life.74 
As far as Site B was concerned, three out of the ten participants from this site noted that 
they would take into consideration whether the alleged victim perceived a particular kind of 
behaviour as anti-social. However, the data collected from this area suggests that a victim’s 
perception of an incident would not affect significantly, or at least not to the extent that this did 
in Site A, the way local enforcement agents conceptualise ASB. As noted by a police officer, 
‘if we are getting repeated calls about the same thing…we are going to look at it to determine 
[whether we] actually need to do something about it because there is a risk to the public’ 
(Int.14-PO-Site B).  
Although the adoption of a more victim-oriented approach by local enforcement agents 
echoes the Government’s promise of ‘putting victims first’ and might prevent cases similar to 
the one of Fiona Pilkington,75 recourse to this approach should not be viewed as a panacea in 
addressing ASB.  As Duggan and Heap maintain, victims and their needs can be used as a 
Trojan horse for the adoption of a more punitive response to ASB, e.g. the imposition of 
tougher restrictions on the perpetrators’ liberty.76 Notwithstanding the adoption of a more 
punitive (and potentially unjustified) response to ASB, what is also problematic about a victim-
oriented approach is that ‘the voice [victims] are given is not necessarily theirs [since they 
have] been carefully stage-managed to ensure that it fits the political message of which it now 
forms a part’.77 Victim and their alleged needs can, therefore, be used by local enforcement 
agents as a means of justify their wide and arbitrary interpretation of ASB’s statutory definition.  
The concerns expressed by Duggan and Heap are further justified by the significant 
variations in communities’ tolerance levels reported particularly in Site B. Evidence collected 
from this site suggests that people in more affluent areas and/or areas with lower crime rates 
tend to be less tolerant towards ASB. In contrast, in areas with high crime rates people tend to 
report only the most serious incidents of ASB ‘because they have to deal with [criminality] on 
a daily basis…it becomes part of their normal lives’ (Int.14-PO-Site B). The following 
statement is illustrative of a number of responses given by many research participants in Site 
B through which these variations were highlighted: ‘you will find this in the more affluent 
areas. The lowest level of anti-social behaviour will be reported there’ (Int.13-PO-Site B). It 
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follows that the way different social groups perceive and approach ASB can vary considerably 
since this is influenced by their socio-economic background. This becomes particularly 
problematic where a strict victim-oriented approach, i.e. no other factors are taken into 
consideration in determining whether someone’s behaviour is anti-social, is adopted by local 
enforcement agents. As discussed above, this could not only lead to the unjustifiable expansion 
of the net of social control, but it can also result in the targeting of certain social groups. It 
follows, therefore, that whilst victims’ voices should be heard, their needs and perceptions 
should not be the sole factor determining whether someone’s behaviour is anti-social.  
 
(iv) Availability of resources 
The data collected from both sites suggested that the implementation of the ASB legal 
framework relied heavily on the amount of resources available at a local level. In nineteen 
interviews the lack of resources and/or the costs of implementation of these measures were 
highlighted as one of the main factors that local enforcement agents would take into 
consideration when determining whether a particular incident should be regarded as anti-social. 
For instance, one local practitioner from Site A noted that:  
Because the resources are becoming a little bit more stretched we try to 
prioritise the cases where there is a personal harm of anti-social 
behaviour. We try to move away from the neighbour disputes and that 
sort of thing (Int.20-LP-Site A).  
As the above account illustrates, the limited availability of resources has led local enforcement 
agents to concentrate on the most serious incidents reported to them. As one police officer 
pointed out, ‘there has to be a realistic understanding…we have reductions in the number of 
police officers. We have to focus on risk and harm’ (Int.11-PO-Site B). The foregoing 
testimonies accurately reflect a number of responses provided by participants who emphasised 
that the limited resources available for tackling ASB and criminality forced them to focus on 
behaviour that had a significant and detrimental impact on people’s quality of life rather than 
on everyday incivilities, such as minor neighbour disputes. The need to prioritise resources, 
however, does not necessarily prevent the inconsistent application of the ASB tools and power. 
In areas with more resources, for instance, local enforcement agents might decide to interpret 
ASB more widely. This is one of the main reasons why this article advocates for the 
formulation of a new code of practice through which a more principled and coherent 
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implementation of the relevant tools and powers can be achieved, rather than one which is 
contingent on the availability of resources at a local level.78 
 
(v) Review procedure 
Collectively the interview data suggested that the main factor that practitioners used to 
determine whether someone’s behaviour was to be classified as anti-social is its impact on 
other members of the community. The findings of this research also echo the findings of 
previous studies which revealed both an overlap between ASB and criminality and the 
possibility of regulating otherwise permissible legal activities through the implementation of 
these measures.79 This was an expected discovery primarily due to the way ASB is defined 
under section 2 of the 2014 Act. As discussed earlier, one of the main criticisms against ASB’s 
statutory definition is its reliance on the impact or likely impact of someone’s behaviour rather 
than on the nature of the conduct in question. Nonetheless, it was evident from the data 
collected that the relevant measures were only utilised in serious cases where the behaviour in 
question was impactful and most commonly repetitive.          
This finding is further strengthened by the fact that in most cases, the initial decision to 
classify someone’s behaviour as anti-social ‘goes through several layers of review’ (Int.18-PO-
Site A). As a police officer put it, ‘it is not just one officer on their own’ who decides whether 
someone’s behaviour is anti-social (Int.12-PO-Site B). Rather, as the following testimony 
elucidates, cases were constantly reviewed both internally and externally: 
We have discussions on a weekly basis about the behaviour … whether 
it is something that falls within the remit of our team. Then we go to 
wider city meetings, the multi-agency assessment and targeting 
meetings. So, we kind of get wider city consent as to what anti-social 
behaviour is (Int.2-LP-Site A). 
Taken as a whole, it was evident from the interviews conducted in both sites that behaviour is 
not arbitrarily labelled as anti-social. The concerns raised above, therefore, regarding the 
expansion of the net of social control to ‘all spheres of life’ through the implementation of ASB 
measures were not borne out by the evidence. The broad and ambiguous drafting of ASB’s 
statutory definition though still enables local enforcement agents to use the law in an arbitrary 
manner. Consequently, it is imperative to formulate mechanisms through which it can be 
ensured that the implementation of the law will not result in the unjustifiable expansion of the 
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net of social control. As explained below, the most viable option is the formulation of a code 
of practice through which a more consistent implementation of the law can be achieved whilst 
retaining the flexibility of these measures. To this end, the data presented above can be 
scrutinised in order to identify principles upon which this new code of practice should be 
structured. 
 
The move to a purely civil injunction 
Although the ASBO’s hybrid nature was one of its most contentious and heavily criticised 
features academically, its abandonment attracted mixed responses from the research 
participants. For the majority of the participants the move to a purely civil injunction was 
unlikely to have any significant effect on the daily administration of ASB. According to the 
data collected during this study, there are three possible explanations for this. First, the majority 
of interviewees noted that the ASBO was just one out of the many tools in their arsenal in 
dealing with ASB and criminality. As one of the interviewees noted: ‘we have got offences 
with which we can still deal with people and I am not overly concerned that the breach is not 
an offence anymore as long as we can still deal with it effectively’ (Int.13-PO-Site B).  
Secondly, reference was made in both areas to the way courts used to deal with those 
who were found in breach of their ASBOs. Two participants from Site B argued that the shift 
to a civil injunction was unlikely to have any impact on the way they were dealing with ASB 
since the ASBO ‘was anyway a toothless tiger’ (Int.14-PO-Site B). According to one police 
officer, ‘under the old legislation we would go back [to court] after breaches time after time 
and nothing would happen to that person. So, I do not think that it particularly concerns me’ 
(Int.14-PO-Site B). In contrast to this, two interviewees from Site A noted that they were ‘quite 
confident’ (Int.4-LP-Site A) that ‘if you are having lots of breaches the next time they go back 
to court it will obviously be taken a lot more seriously’ (Int.7-LP-Site A).  
Thirdly, for some interviewees this shift towards a purely civil injunction was unlikely 
to have any real effect on certain individuals. According to them, the main reason for this was 
that some perpetrators would simply not comply with a court order or an injunction regardless 
of the possible consequences. One interviewee noted that ‘you are still going to get the twenty 
per cent who do not care. They do not care because they have other issues’ (Int.8-LP-Site A).  
Ten interviewees expressed their concerns as to whether a purely civil response will be 
as effective as the ASBO used to be in dealing with ASB. Many of the participants focused on 
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the effectiveness of the ASBO as a ‘bargaining tool for working with a person and getting them 
to understand the consequences of their behaviour’ (Int.4-LP-Site A). It had been suggested 
that the criminal nature of the ASBO’s second limb acted as a leverage for the perpetrators to 
change their behaviour. Consequently, this shift to a purely civil method of regulation means 
that those who act in an anti-social manner are no longer provided with ‘prudential reasons for 
desistence’.80 As one police officer explained ‘it is a real shame…I think it has taken some of 
the bite away from the legislation’ (Int.12-PO-Site B). 
Another cause for concern for many participants was the fact that a power of arrest is 
not automatically attached to an injunction. According to some participants, obtaining a power 
of arrest is not as easy as it might appear to be:  
In reality it will be unlikely to get a power of arrest attached to the 
injunction for him despite him having more aggravated offences on his 
record than anybody else in our city. He is someone who actually if 
anything is to work is the imminence of arrest and significant sanction. 
An injunction would not do that (Int.1-LP-Site A). 
The abovementioned concerns in conjunction with the limited amount of resources available 
led many of the participants to express their reservations as to whether they should be applying 
for the issue of an injunction. According to one of the interviewees ‘it makes me think what 
the point is. One of the things is that it costs a lot of money and if it is not a criminal offence, 
then for what purpose?’ (Int.3-LP-Site A). This finding was further supported by a number of 
other testimonies based on which local enforcement agents are now more focused on getting a 
CBO rather than an injunction. As one interviewee pointed out, ‘I think that there is more 
pressure to get a criminal order because: (a) you have the power of arrest more or less kind of 
automatic; and (b) in theory the court will cost less’ (Int.15-PO-Site A).  
This focus on the post-conviction order is not a new phenomenon. Between 2002 and 
2013 the number of CrASBOs issued was almost twice the number of ASBOs.81 The above 
finding, however, raises fundamental questions about the administration of justice which 
appears to be driven to a large extent by the amount of resources available at a local level rather 
than by principles of justice.  
Most importantly, it undermines (at least to some extent) the preventive nature of the 
injunction which is premised on the assumption that the state should be able to address ASB at 
an early stage in order to prevent it from escalating to serious criminality.82 The focus on the 
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CBO, however, means that local enforcement agents will have to wait for someone to be 
convicted of an offence in order to address their ASB. This is in line with the findings of Lewis 
et al who found that the implementation of the ASB measures ‘refute[s] the logical sequencing 
of prevention’ because some of those against whom these measures were used had ‘already 
engaged in serious or persistent offending’.83  
 
The introduction of positive obligations 
The introduction of positive obligations under the 2014 Act was regarded by the Government 
as a necessary addition since ‘in many cases, there are underlying causes of the anti-social 
behaviour’.84 This study found that the majority of the interviewees perceived this addition as 
a positive development, since it enables them to work with the perpetrators to address the 
underlying causes of their behaviour. As one of the interviewees pointed out ‘in a lot of cases 
you can only address anti-social behaviour if you address the underlying causes…and 
sometimes I think people need to be pushed or even ordered to seek help’ (Int.2-LP-Site A). 
Moreover, some interviewees noted that positive obligations can also be used to repair the harm 
caused to victims by, for instance, ‘mak[ing] someone clean up street graffiti’ (Int.26-LP-Site 
A).  
According to some of the participants, positive obligations were already used through 
acceptable behaviour agreements. A police officer explained that these agreements were not 
just used to put restrictions on the perpetrator’s behaviour, but they were used as a means of 
referring people to ‘juvenile services or attend this club six times a week’ (Int.29-PO-Site A). 
The foregoing testimony is consistent with the findings of Crawford et al who found that 
positive obligations were already imposed ‘by way of support services to be accessed by the 
individual’.85 Nevertheless, it was evident from the testimonies provided that for the majority 
of the participants the introduction of positive obligations is a step in the right direction. 
Clearly, positive obligations can be utilised to provide permanent relief to those affected 
by ASB whilst offering to the perpetrator the necessary support needed to address the 
underlying causes of their behaviour. It is imperative though to be mindful of: i) how restrictive 
these obligations can be on the perpetrator’s liberty; and ii) the challenges (both normative and 
practical) posed by paternalistic interventions of this kind.86 
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Further reflections 
Despite the criticisms raised about the extensive magnitude of discretion afforded to courts and 
local enforcement agents regarding the scope of the ASB legislation and how this can be 
misused, the 2014 amendments did little to mitigate against these concerns. In fact, the 2014 
Act extended the potential scope of the law even further whilst also allowing for the imposition 
of positive obligations. Based on the data collected though, the behaviour dealt with through 
these measures was impactful and in most of the cases persistent. This was due to the fact that 
the decision to classify someone’s behaviour as anti-social was informed by a number of factors 
which partly compensated for the apparent broadness of ASB’s statutory definition. Some of 
these factors, such as the limited availability of resources, were beyond the research 
participants’ control. Others though, such as the presence of presence of a review procedure 
(both internal and external), were the product of good practice and they were equally 
instrumental in terms of limiting the scope of the law to behaviour that really had an impact on 
people’s quality of life.  
 That notwithstanding, the 2014 Act still provides a significant magnitude of discretion 
to local enforcement agents as to the scope of the law in this area and the implementation of 
the relevant tools and powers. It is, therefore, possible for the implementation of these measures 
to vary considerably across England and Wales. Hence, the findings of this study might not 
accurately reflect how these measures are used in other areas. It should also be borne in mind 
that this study examined the implementation of the 2014 amendments from an enforcement 
perspective, i.e. it interviewed local enforcement agents, not victims and/or those against whom 
these measures are used. Perpetrators, for instance, might argue that the relevant legislation 
was used in an arbitrary manner against behaviour which is part of everyday human interaction. 
Similarly, victims might highlight the need for a more proactive response to ASB.  
The findings of this study mitigate against some of the concerns raised regarding the 
potential scope of the ASB legislation. The broad and ambiguous drafting of the relevant 
statutory provisions, however, necessitate some kind of response by the Government and/or 
the legislature, e.g. legal reform, through which clarity and consistency can be achieved across 
England and Wales. It is argued that the most viable option would be formulation of a code of 
practice for local enforcement agents. 87   Through this code of practice further guidance can 
be provided to local enforcement agents regarding the scope of the law in this area and what 
measures must be put in place at a local level in order to restrict the potential for misuse.  
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Before elaborating further on the content of the proposed code of practice, it is 
imperative to explain why legislative reform is not the most viable option. It should be borne 
in mind that the ASB legal framework has recently been reformed. Further legislative reform, 
therefore, at this stage appears to be unrealistic. Even if there was appetite for reform, this 
would require, for instance, the legislature to limit the scope of the law to behaviour that 
actually has a significant and detrimental effect on people’s lives rather than on one which 
might to do so in the future. This, however, could significantly undermine local enforcement 
agents’ ability to deal swiftly and effectively with certain kinds of ASB. Evidently, the current 
definition of ASB provides local enforcement agents with the necessary discretion and 
flexibility needed to address a range of behaviour that negatively affect their communities. For 
these reasons, it is argued that the most viable option is the formulation of a new code of 
practice for local enforcement agents. To this end, the findings of this study can be utilised in 
order to identify principles/mechanisms, e.g. the need for internal and external review 
procedures, which can limit the scope of the law to behaviour which is really impactful and 
persistent whilst retaining a flexible legal framework. 
The formulation of a new code of practice is not a panacea in preventing the misuse of 
the ASB tools and powers. Instruments of this kind are advisory and not legally binding. 
Moreover, the fact that the proposed code of practice is intended to be a universally applicable 
instrument means that it might fail to take into account the specificities of each area, e.g. the 
amount of resources available. Nonetheless, its successful integration into existing ASB 
policies is capable of bringing clarity and consistency to the implementation of the ASB tools 
and powers whilst preventing their potential misuse.  
 
Conclusion 
This article presented the first empirical data on the implementation of the 2014 amendments 
on the law on ASB. The 2014 Act was the first major legislative attempt to reform the 1998 
Act, the initial legal framework on ASB. Despite the criticisms raised about the ambiguous 
scope of the law under the 1998 Act, the 2014 amendments extended the potential ambit of the 
ASB legislation even further. There was strong evidence from this study to suggest, however, 
that local enforcement agents take into consideration a number of factors in determining 
whether someone’s behaviour should be classified as anti-social. These factors tend to restrict 
the ambit of the law to behaviour which was impactful and most commonly repetitive. 
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Although at face value the findings of this study appear to be encouraging, the relevant 
legislation can still be misused due to the significant magnitude of discretion afforded to local 
enforcement agents. For this reason, it has been argued that a new code of practice should be 
formulated regarding the implementation of the ASB measures. The findings of this study can 
assist in the formulation of the proposed code of practice since they do not only provide insights 
on the implementation of the 2014 amendments, but they also identify mechanisms through 
which the abuse of these measures can be prevented.         
As far as the shift to a purely civil injunction is concerned, this appears to assuage some 
of the criticisms raised about the ASBO and how this could be used to criminalise indirectly 
certain kinds of behaviour. Evidence from this study, however, suggest that this shift to a purely 
civil response was approached with great deal of scepticism by many local enforcement agents 
who expressed their reservations as to the overall effectiveness of the injunction in terms of 
preventing further ASB. Looking forward, given the limited availability of resources and the 
reservations expressed by local enforcement agents about this shift to a purely civil response, 
it is interesting to examine whether this will result in the de facto abolition of the injunction. 
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